In the last days of September 2006, Nikolai Spasski, deputy chief of the Russian Federal Agency of Atomic Energy (Rosatom), visited the city of Angarsk in southeast central Russia with a delegation of Rosatom officials to discuss practical issues associated with the creation of an International Uranium Enrichment Center at the Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Combine. The site currently houses one of Russia’s principal uranium enrichment facilities. Spasski’s visit marked the start of efforts to implement an initiative first announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin in January 2006. [1] The head of Rosatom, Sergey Kiriyenko, declared on October 25, 2006, that the new International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk would officially open by the end of 2006. [2]

The Russian initiative to create international centers for the enrichment of uranium is part of an effort led by the United States, Russia, and other developed countries to stem the spread of national enrichment facilities in states like Iran that are not currently operating full-scale facilities of this kind. Uranium enrichment is considered one of the most sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle from the standpoint of non-proliferation: although the technology is essential for the production of “low enriched” uranium fuel for nuclear power plants, it can also be used to produce highly enriched uranium, one of the two materials used as the core of nuclear weapons.

In offering enrichment services to foreign customers, Russia hopes to create a cost-effective alternative to indigenous enrichment facilities for states that seek to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Indeed, Putin’s January 2006 initiative was part of Moscow’s negotiations with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program and was intended to dissuade that country from developing its own uranium enrichment capability. Although Iran rejected the Russian offer, Moscow hopes that International Uranium Enrichment Centers may be more successful where other countries are concerned.

According to the Russian plan, any state needing nuclear fuel would be able to enter into a commercial contract with the Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center. [3] Following the normal practice for international trade in nuclear fuel, the natural uranium to be enriched would be obtained on the international market or from sources in the contracting state, and would then be enriched in Russia and sent back to the contracting state for use in its nuclear reactors. For example, it is known that Ukraine, which plans to fabricate its own nuclear power plant fuel, intends to follow this approach, sending domestically produced uranium for enrichment to other countries, including Russia and possibly Western European nations, and then manufacturing fuel rods from the enriched material at its own fuel fabrication plants for use in Ukrainian reactors. (See “Ukraine to Develop Nuclear Fuel Production Capability, But Without Uranium Enrichment,” in the November 2006 issue of WMD Insights.) Speaking in Vienna in September 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that access to these services would be “non-discriminatory.” [4] (Although Russia has not disclosed details regarding which states might be eligible to purchase fuel under this policy, the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, of which Russia is a member, permit civil nuclear exports to all states that accept IAEA inspections on all of their nuclear facilities, a category that includes Iran.)

In his October 25, 2006, statement, Kiriyenko also announced that the Angarsk Center will be operated in close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and that Russia will voluntarily place the plant under IAEA safeguards. [5] One Russian official noted, however, that the question of how exactly IAEA safeguards will be applied to the Angarsk Center will be decided through future negotiations. [6] As a nuclear-weapon state recognized under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Russia is not obligated to place any nuclear facilities under IAEA monitoring, but has agreed voluntarily to place certain elements of its nuclear program, such as its excess nuclear weapons material, under IAEA inspection to ensure it is not used for nuclear arms.

At the same time, Russia has expressed reservations about a plan advanced by the IAEA to create an international “nuclear fuel bank,” a program also aimed at discouraging the development of indigenous uranium enrichment capabilities, which would guarantee nuclear fuel to states if traditional sources of supply were suddenly cut off. In September 2006, Kiriyenko stated that such a plan could stifle market competition and indicated that Russian support for the IAEA initiative would depend on the pricing policy it employs and on the conditions established for the release of nuclear fuel. [7]

Reportedly, Angarsk was chosen as the site for the International Uranium Enrichment Center because the Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Combine already has a uranium enrichment capacity that has not been part of the Russian nuclear weapons complex, meaning that less stringent security rules apply. This would enable the combine to participate more easily in an international venture than more sensitive weapons-related nuclear facilities. [8] Although the official opening of the Angarsk Center is scheduled for the end of 2006, the existing capacity will have to be expanded to meet the overall goals of the new initiative. Enlargement of the complex will probably take four to five years, and the cost of the endeavor is unofficially estimated at $2 billion. Recouping this investment could take as long as 10-15 years, although much will depend on the state of the international uranium enrichment market, which is expected to grow substantially over the next decade. [9]

According to Rosatom’s plan, the Angarsk Center will not be a purely Russian venture, but will be financed in concert with, and operated in conjunction with, a small number of other states. Non-nuclear weapon-states that participate in the joint venture will not obtain access to highly enriched uranium, however, or to enrichment technology. Kazakhstan has already announced its decision to join, and a Russian-Kazakh agreement on the establishment of a joint venture Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk was signed on October 12 in Moscow. [10]

Another potential participant apparently is China: during a recent visit to that country, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov suggested that the Angarsk Center could become a nuclear fuel services center
for the entire Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which both China and Russia – as well as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – are members. [11] In November 2006, the Russian-Chinese committee responsible for the preparation of bilateral summit meetings disclosed that Russia and China planned to conclude a framework agreement on uranium enrichment services and nuclear fuel transfers. [12]

Along with contributing to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the Russian initiative on International Uranium Enrichment Centers is also expected to help the expansion of a profitable business sector in Russia. Speaking in Vienna in mid-September 2006, Kiriyenko disclosed that Russia intended to increase its share of the world nuclear fuel market from six percent to 25 percent. [13]

It should be noted, however, that the Angarsk Center will address only one sensitive stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, the enrichment of uranium. The other stage considered equally sensitive is the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear reactor fuel (“reprocessing”) – a step that could also produce weapons-grade nuclear materials. Russia also plans to offer its reprocessing capacity as a service to foreign states, but these activities would be concentrated at sites in Russia other than Angarsk. In the summer of 2006, Sergey Kiriyenko announced the selection of Zheleznogorsk as the site for a spent fuel storage facility. [14] More recently, the Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences Nikolai Laverov disclosed that Krasnokamensk is also being considered for that role. [15]

Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies

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