IRAN REACTS TO UN, U.S. SANCTIONS
February 2007 Issue
 

On December 23, 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1737, imposing sanctions on Iran for failing to suspend activities related to uranium enrichment and the production of plutonium. [1] The activities targeted by the sanctions could provide Iran with materials usable for nuclear weapons.

The debate in Iran following adoption of the resolution has been robust. Along with denunciations of the UN and strong statements of support for the country’s nuclear program, a new theme has emerged, as critics, including those from the ranks of the country’s powerful conservative clerics, have challenged Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, arguing that he has mishandled the nuclear portfolio and neglected more urgent domestic issues. Until recently, the country’s nuclear program had enjoyed nearly universal support and “nuclear nationalism” had been a unifying rallying point in the country. In the wake of the Security Council action, however, this issue has become divisive, even to the point of fomenting dissent within Iran’s political elite.

Iran Victimized, Unalterably Committed to Nuclear Program

A common theme in the Iranian media was outrage that Iran had been sanctioned when the December 2006 comment by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert indicating that Israel possessed nuclear weapons program failed to elicit international condemnation. (
See related story in this issue of WMD Insights.) Most of the Iranian coverage of UNSC Resolution 1737 framed the resolution as embodying a “double standard” in light of Olmert’s admission. Indeed, Javad Zarif, Iran’s ambassador to the UN, made this point in a statement delivered to the Council after the adoption of the resolution. [2]

The official state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) similarly focused attention on the Israeli Prime Minister’s disclosure: “Israel has stepped up activities to cover up the scandal of admitting its stockpiles of nuclear arms by its ringleader Ehud Olmert after two decades.” The news item then immediately shifted its attention to Israel’s lobbying efforts in Europe to present the Iranian nuclear program as a threat. It quoted the Israel newspaper Yediot Aharonot as stating, “’The dispatched Israeli delegations in their meetings with EU officials provided them with security reports on the program that prove Iran has reached a no return point in its drive towards achieving the nuclear bomb.’” [3]

The conservative paper Keyhan (“The Nation”) also condemned the UN and its inaction regarding Israel’s program. It quoted the secretary of Iran’s National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, as stating, “Although the Zionists made such a claim we can see that the Security Council, which is the guardian of international peace and security, chose to maintain total silence against such a claim instead of making an immediate reaction.” Referring to the UN resolution, Larijani continued: “Our immediate response is that we will start our activities at the Natanz site, which has a 3,000 centrifuge facility, and we will continue our activities with full speed.” [4] Approximately three weeks later, the plan to install 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz was reaffirmed, and Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini reiterated that operations at the Natanz enrichment facility would continue despite the UN Security Council resolution. [5]

The reformist Ayande-ye Now (“The New Future”) was no less enthusiastic about Iran’s nuclear plans, featuring a lengthy interview with Iranian Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) chief Gholamreza Aghazadeh. [6] The article quoted the AEOI director as boasting: “Iran has succeeded in producing more than 250 tons of yellow cake (UF6) and at present, it is producing four percent enriched uranium.” [Note: The quoted comment contains a technical error: “yellowcake” is uranium oxide, a powder that is a precursor to UF6 – uranium hexafluoride – the easily gasified form of uranium that is used directly in the enrichment process. In June 2006, the IAEA reported that Iran possessed 116 metric tons of UF6, suggesting that Aghazadeh intended to say that Iran had increased its stocks of the material to 250 tons.]

In response to recently imposed sanctions and rumors of an imminent aerial attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Aghazadeh declared that punitive actions would not eliminate his nation’s program, because “nuclear knowledge has been institutionalized.” Noting that the students at Iran’s “superior universities” are the key to Iran’s nuclear program, he estimated that thousands of students had studied nuclear science and engineering at these schools. Underscoring his point, he stated that the UF6 production plant at Isfahan, an essential component of the Iranian nuclear program, was designed by a 27-year-old Iranian-trained specialist. Graduates, he stressed, have received lucrative offers to work abroad, but have refused them due to “their national and religious sense and the identity they have found in nuclear progress.” Highlighting the dual religious and secular foundations for the nuclear program, Aghazadeh revealed that his inspiration for developing the Iranian nuclear capacity came while he was visiting the shrine of Imam Riza in Mashad, a revered figure in Shi’a Islam. He also quoted the Deputy to the President as saying that Iran’s nuclear era constitutes “the most distinguished period in the last 300 years of Iran’s history.”

Other analysts called on Iran to reexamine its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Pursuant to Iran’s status as a party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the agency currently inspects all nuclear sites in Iran to ensure they are not being used for nuclear weapons purposes. A December 24, 2006, editorial in the conservative newspaper Jomhuri-ye Eslami (“The Islamic Republic”), proposed that Iran consider barring these inspections, stating that the United States opposes “the basic existence of this [the Iranian Revolutionary] regime, and they will not rest until they topple this system.  Consequently we too must reconsider the manner of our cooperation with the IAEA.” [7]  (Indeed, in early 2007, the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee denied entry permits to 38 IAEA inspectors.) [8]

Ahmadinejad Challenged
Notably, however, on January 9, 2007, barely two weeks later, the same conservative paper, which exalts Ayatollah Khomeini’s legacy, featured an editorial that contradicted the nationalist line it had taken in December and severely criticized Ahmadinejad’s stance on the nation’s nuclear program. [9] The editorial directly addressed the Iranian President by name and provided a list of mistakes he has made, stating, for example:

2. You discuss important decisions about the nuclear issue in speeches that give the impression that these decisions are made lightly. You mention 3,000 centrifuges one day and 60,000 the next. These statements and others like them do not appear to be responsible, planned statements.

3. Your manner in discussing the nuclear issue is aggressive and hostile. Why is the President taking this tone, which gives the people the impression that you are taking a hard line on the nuclear issue?

4. You have made the nuclear issue the main issue of your administration while in reality it is an issue for the [political] system to deal with. [Presidential] Administrations pass, but national issues will remain. [10]
The editorial highlighted how the nuclear issue has caused other national issues to be neglected, such as “inflation, high prices, unemployment.” It also exhorted the President to practice “moderation and prudence,” reminding him that “diplomacy requires negotiation and compromise.” Given the newspaper’s close links to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, the editorial appeared to be a directive to Ahmadinejad to change course and, in diverging so abruptly from the nationalist rhetoric long surrounding the country’s nuclear program, seemed to signal that Khamane’i intended to moderate Iran’s nuclear diplomacy and limit the President’s influence on the nuclear issue.

Reformist newspapers also criticized Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policies. The daily of the Etemad-e Melli Party (National Dependence Party) of the cleric Mehdi Karrubi featured an editorial on January 11, 2007, entitled, “Prudence in Government Administration,” criticizing the Iranian President for allowing the Iranian nuclear issue to reach the UN Security Council. The editorial also complained that the reformist camp it belongs to has come under attack from the President, who has turned this faction into a scapegoat: “Does His Excellency Mr. Ahmadinejad really believe that his domestic critics have formed a pressure group lobbying the Security Council to issue a resolution and impose sanctions?” It further assailed the President’s leadership skills during this crisis: “Mr. Ahmadinejad! You are the president of all Iranians. Therefore, you must act like a president.” It concluded that he has alienated even his core supporters in the political elite due to his handling of the nuclear issue. [11]

Response to U.S. Sanctions
In parallel with the imposition of sanctions by the UN, in the beginning of January 2007, the United States imposed sanctions unilaterally on one of Iran’s largest banks, Bank Sepah. [12] Important details about the bank’s involvement in Iran’s missile program were provided by the Republic of Korea’s Yonhap News Agency. It stated that the sanctions targeted the bank for facilitating transactions between Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization and North Korea’s missile-related exporter, the Korean Mining and Industrial Development Corp. [13] According to the report, the state-owned bank is also believed to be behind financing the purchase of missile-related technology from China that aided Iran in designing its Shahab missiles.

The sanctions prohibit American citizens, banks, and businesses from conducting financial transactions with Bank Sepah. The Iranian media framed this event as an escalation of “America’s financial war on Iran.” [14] One Iranian news item stated that the bank was sanctioned for its alleged role “as a facilitator of Iran’s weapons programs,” pursuant to the 2006 Iran Freedom Support Act, which requires the U.S. Treasury Department to sanction Iranian organizations involved in “the acquisition of missile technology.” Nevertheless, due to the timing of these events, the Iranian news agency also framed the incident within the context of the UN resolution: “It is also the first penalty America has imposed since the UN Security Council passed watered-down sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program last month in UN resolution 1737.” It quoted U.S. Undersecretary of Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Stuart Levey who described the bank as “the financial linchpin of Iran’s missile procurement network” followed by a quote from Larijani, stating that these actions “are not issues that can affect Iran’s will.” [15]

Conclusion
Recent developments in Iran in the wake of Resolution 1737 demonstrate the emergence of what one article deemed a domestic “coalition of the concerned,” which has confronted Ahmadinejad over his approach to the nuclear issue. [16] Both reformists and conservatives have indicated through their affiliated media that they lack confidence in the President’s handling of the nuclear issue — a sharp counterpoint to the widespread support the program itself continues to enjoy. Seen in the context of other recent intensifications of external pressures on the country, including the increased U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf and U.S. seizures of Iranian agents in Iraq, it is possible that political forces in Iran are realigning and, in the months ahead, will compel Ahmadinejad to moderate his hard-line stance with respect to the country’s nuclear program and perhaps with respect to other international controversies,
as well.

Meanwhile, the internal debate continues, with reformist politician Hussein Marashi complaining on January 22, 2007, that Ahmadinejad’s statements are “propaganda” and that he has exaggerated Iran’s progress in its nuclear program: “Whenever he has raised the issue on different occasions, the president has exaggerated the degree of Iran’s progress [in the nuclear field]. This actually works against the interests of Iran, and merely serves to provide the enemies with pretexts to put pressure on Iran.” [17]

Ibrahim Al-Marashi – Koc University



 



SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] United Nations, Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, Security Council, “Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran For Failure To Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1737 (2006),” 5612th Meeting, December 23, 2006, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm.
[View Article]
[2] “Iran Slams Security Council Over Israel,” Fars News Agency, News Item: 8510030198, December 24, 2006, http://www.farsnews.com/English/newstext.php?nn=8510030198. [View Article]
[3] “Israel Tries To Cover Up Scandal of Olmert’s Nuke Arms Admission,” Islamic Republic News Agency, December 23, 2006, http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-17/0612236598172254.htm. [View Article]
[4] “Pasakh-e iran beh qatinameh rahandazi 3000 santirfuz” [Iran’s response to UN resolution, 3000 centrifuges], Keyhan, December 24, 2006 [http://www.kayhannews.ir/851003/index.htm].
[5] “Iran Continues N. Operations At Natanz,” Fars News Agency, January 14, 2007, http://english.farsnews.com/
newstext.php?nn=8510240247&cid=1112708187&ei=dfWpRdK7B4P8pQLZw-T-CQ. [View Article]
[6] “Aghazadeh: ‘We Have Produced More Than 250 Tons of Yellow Cake’ – The Untold Facts About Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Ayande-ye Now [The New Future], January 6, 2007.
[7] “Tajdid-e nazr dar hamkari ajans” [Reconsideration of Cooperation with the Agency], Jomhuri-ye Eslami, December 24, 2006 [http://www.jomhourieslami.com/1385/13851003/index.html].
[8] “Iran Refuses to Grant Entry Permits to IAEA Inspectors,” Fars News Agency January 22, 2007,
http://www.farsnews.com/English/newstext.php?nn=8511020505. [View Article]
[9] “Payami baraye dustan-e enghilab” [Message to the Friends of the Revolution], Jomhuri-ye Eslami, January 9, 2007.
[10] Ibid.
[11] “Tadbir hukumet dari” [Prudence in Government Administration], Etemad-e Melli, January 11, 2007
[http://www.roozna.com/Negaresh_site/FullStory/?Id=28965&Title=تدبير%20حكومت‌داري%20-%20سرمقاله%20اعتمادملي%2021%20دي%201385].
[12] “U.S. Bars Iranian Bank To Curb Access to Dollars,” Washington Post, January 19, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/09/AR2007010901466.html. [View Article]
[13] “U.S. Raises Concerns Over North Korea-Iran Financial Links Through WMD,” Yonhap News, January 9, 2007, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/Engnews/20070110/410100000020070110041224E5.html. [View Article]
[14] “US Sanctions One of Iran’s Largest Banks,” Tehran Fars News Agency, January 10, 2007, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8510200273. [View Article]
[15] Ibid.
[16] Najmeh Bozorgmehr and Gareth Smyth, “Coalition of the Concerned Grows in Iran,” Financial Times, January 17, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ccdefc8e-a672-11db-937f-0000779e2340.html. [View Article]
[17] “Marashi: Dunyara alih khod basij nakonim” [We Should Not Mobilize the World Against Us], January 22, 2007 [http://www.aftabnews.ir/vdciwwat1zaqw.htm].