Russia’s efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces made an important advance in December 2006, with the deployment of the first road-mobile Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), but also suffered a significant disappointment when yet another test of the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) ended in failure. The slow pace of deployments of the former system and the difficulties Russia has experienced in developing the latter mean Moscow will be forced to rely on Soviet-era systems far more heavily than it had originally anticipated.

Road-Mobile Topol-M ICBMs Enter Service
On December 4, 2006, Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov informed President Vladimir Putin that the first regiment of road-mobile Topol-M ICBMs was being put on combat duty. [1] Ten days later Putin visited the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) division deployed in Teykovo (Ivanovo oblast in the European part of Russia) to inspect the new regiment. He was shown the three missile launchers, with support vehicles, and observed a simulated missile launch. [2]

This event marks an important milestone in the development of the Russian strategic nuclear posture. The Topol-M was designed to be deployed in both silo- and road-mobile basing modes, but until December 2006, only the silo-based version had been deployed. Forty-two silo-based Topol-M ICBMs have been emplaced since 1997. Although Ivanov’s report indicated that a full regiment of road-mobile Topol-Ms (a regiment comprises nine launchers with missiles) had been made operational, in fact, only a sub-regimental unit of three launchers and their missiles was deployed. (In the Russian military, the unit is known as a “brigade.”) In accordance with the usual procedure, the first group was put on “test-combat duty” (opytno-boevoe dezhurstvo); in 1997, the firsts two silo-based Topol-Ms were similarly put on “test-combat duty.” [3]

Russian officials went to considerable lengths to emphasize that deployment of the new weapon system would preserve the deterrent capability of Russia’s strategic forces, whose older, Soviet-produced ICBMs are scheduled to be retired. Yuri Solomonov, director and designer-general of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), where the Topol-M was designed, declared that the new missile would be the core of Russian strategic forces until 2045. [4] According to the SRF Commander-in-Chief Nikolay Solovtsov, deployment of road-mobile Topol-Ms will be “synchronized” with the retirement of the previous-generation Topols, but since the warranty period for the new missile is 50 percent longer than that of its predecessors, the new force will remain in service for a considerably longer period of time. [5]

Ivanov confirmed that the road-mobile Topol-M, which currently carries a single warhead, would be equipped with three independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs); Ivanov did not indicate whether the silo-based Topol-Ms would be similarly modified. [6] However, because the START I treaty prohibits increasing the number of warheads on existing missile types, MIRVing the Topol-Ms will have to wait until the treaty’s expiration in December 2009 or until it is replaced with a new treaty that allows this option. [7] According to Solomonov, MIRVing of the Topol-M should allow Russia to retain about 2,000 warheads on strategic launchers by 2012, the implementation deadline for the 2002 Moscow Treaty. [8] That treaty requires the United States and Russia to reduce warheads deployed on operational strategic missiles and bombers to between 1,700 and 2,200.

Russian officials paid particular attention to the defense-penetration capabilities of the road-mobile Topol-M. It has been previously reported that the new missiles would be equipped with maneuverable warheads, intended to evade interception at the re-entry phase of their trajectory. [9] In addition, the new missile is reportedly able to avoid interception at boost phase by utilizing several dozen small engines, which enable it to follow a “snake-like” trajectory during boost phase instead of the usual ballistic trajectory. [10]

Deployment Rate of New ICBMs Insufficient to Replace Soviet-Era Missiles
These plans notwithstanding, the rate of deployment of Topol-M ICBMs remains very low, raising questions as to whether it will be possible for Moscow to replace all of its aging Soviet-era ICBMs by the middle or even the end of the next decade. In fact, in contrast to Solovtsov’s assertion, quoted above, that deployment of Topol-Ms is “synchronized” with the removal of their predecessors from service, there is considerable evidence that current weapon acquisition plans do not foresee such replacement at all.

Speaking in November 2006 at a meeting of defense industry managers, Defense Minister Ivanov disclosed that by 2015 the Ministry of Defense plans to purchase 69 additional Topol-M ICBMs – roughly one third to be silo-based, and the remainder road-mobile. [11] This would mean an average deployment of seven missiles per year, a much lower rate than the plan Russia announced in the late 1990s of deploying
16-20 missiles per year and vastly lower than the Soviet deployment rate of 45 new ICBMs per year. Indeed, 2007 acquisition plans foresee the purchase of only three road-mobile and two silo-based
Topol-Ms. [12] Moreover, in 2006, while the three new road-mobile Topol-Ms were fielded, no new silo-based Topol-Ms were deployed, a break with the tradition of deploying several of the latter each December since the late 1990s.

Moscow faces an additional challenge as it modernizes its missile force: the current rate of deployment will cause a temporary reduction in the overall number of road-mobile ICBMs in Russia’s strategic arsenal. In order to deploy a brigade (three launchers) of Topol-Ms, the SRF had to eliminate an entire regiment (nine launchers) of older Topols, because START I prohibits deployment of different types of missiles within the same “restricted area” (a START I term, which, for Russia, designates the deployment zone of an SRF regiment). This rule has caused additional complaints about the “inadequacy” of START I. [13]

Other shortcomings associated with the SRF rearmament program have surfaced recently. According to missile designer Vladimir Bukhshtab, almost all the funds made available for new missile systems have been spent on the missile and the launcher, themselves, leaving the development of mobile division command units and related communication centers lagging behind. As a result, some analysts have complained that the effectiveness of the new road-mobile Topol-M system has been noticeably impaired. [14]

The slow deployment rate of new ICBMs means that the SRF must continue relying on older Soviet-era missiles. On November 18, 2006, the SRF conducted a launch of an UR-100NUTTKh (known as SS-19 in the United States and RS-18 under the START I designation system) from the Baykonur center in Kazakhstan. Following the successful launch, the SRF extended the warranty period of these missiles to 30 years, three times longer than the original warranty. This will allow Russia to reduce its requirements for deploying new missiles. [15] In December, the SRF launched a 19-year-old R-36M2 (known as SS-18 or RS-20 under START I) from a missile base in Orenburg oblast. Based on the results of that launch, Solovtsov declared that the warranty period for missiles of that type would be extended to 20 years. [16]

According to Solovtsov, the majority of existing ICBMs will be retained until at least 2014-2016. [17] Independent commentators have suggested, however, that if the pace of deployment of new ICBMs is not accelerated in the next decade and Soviet-era missiles are retired at the end of their extended service lives, the overall size of the ICBM force could be one third of what it is today. [18]

New Failure in Bulava Program
On December 25, 2006, the Russian Navy conducted a flight test of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile Bulava. This test came soon after two earlier failed tests in September and October 2006. [19] The December 25 test failed, as well. Apparently reflecting the shock from a third consecutive failure, the Ministry of Defense and MITT refused even to confirm that the test took place and immediately classified all information about the test series. [20] Nonetheless, information about the failed tests leaked almost instantly to the media and, in addition, media sources reported that the test conducted a year earlier, in December 2005, which had been considered successful, may have been a failure, as well. [21] A special governmental commission was created to study the causes of the failures, while another was created by the Ministry of Defense to investigate how information about failed Bulava launches leaked to the media.

Some details were provided a few days later by Anatoly Perminov, the head of RosKosmos, the governmental agency in charge of Russia’s space program. He acknowledged that the Bulava launch had failed and said that while the first and the second stages of the missile “worked perfectly,” the third stage had experienced “certain problems.” He noted that the third stage had exploded over the Sea of Okhotsk, but it remained unclear whether the stage exploded independently or was deliberately destroyed (either automatically or by a command from the launch control center) because of a malfunction. Perminov said, however, that the new setback was “nothing tragic” because usually 12 to 14 launches are needed to complete the development of a new missile. He suggested that more time should be spent on laboratory work before the next attempt. [22]

The failure of Bulava puts the entire program of modernizing the naval leg of Russia’s strategic triad at risk. [23] It is worth recalling that the earlier submarine-launched ballistic missile program, known as “Bark,” was canceled in the mid-1990s after three failed launches. MITT was awarded the contract for Bulava in 1998 after it promised that it could develop a new SLBM quickly and at a low price. Following that decision, construction of the first Borey class submarine, the Yuri Dolgoruki, whose keel had been laid in 1996, had to be redesigned to accommodate the new missile. The program was run on a very tight schedule, with the Yuri Dolgoruki set to begin sea trials in 2007 and to receive its new missiles as early as 2008. The failure of the third – if not the fourth – consecutive Bulava test now makes it uncertain whether the missiles intended for it will be available. The first submarine of the Typhoon class, Dmitri Donskoi, which was rebuilt to carry the Bulava and has been used for flight tests of the new SLBM, also remains unarmed.

Media reports on the new failure of Bulava concurred that the program would be continued simply because Russia does not have an alternative. Without new SSBNs, the Russian Navy will be left to operate Soviet-era submarines, whose service lives will eventually expire.

Overhaul of Older Submarines Helps Maintain Naval Leg of Triad
As the Bulava program hit another stumbling bloc, Russia continued work on the overhaul of its Delta IV (Project 667 BDRM) SSBNs. Periodic overhauls are vital to keep the submarines in operation for their entire expected service lives. This work virtually stopped after the Soviet Union broke apart, but was resumed in the late 1990s.

In September 2006, a Delta IV SSBN, K-117 Bryansk left the docks of the Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk, a step that represents an important milestone in its refitting. Bryansk, which entered service in 1989, has spent four years in overhaul. It is scheduled to reenter service in 2008 and to
remain operational for 10 years. Bryansk was reported to have received 82 different upgrades, including those intended to reduce noise during operations and to enhance its ability to detect enemy submarines. [24]

The Bryansk is the fourth Delta IV submarine to undergo overhaul. It was preceded by K-51 Verkhoturie (1999), K-84 Yekaterinberg (2003), and K-114 Tula (2006). The next, SSBN to undergo overhaul is Karelia, which is scheduled to enter drydock in 2007. After being overhauled, Delta IV submarines are equipped with new Sineva SLBMs, a modified version of SS-N-23. In contrast to its predecessor, which carried four warheads, Sineva is equipped with ten. The first Delta IV submarine scheduled to receive Sineva missiles is Tula, which will be ready to receive the missiles in 2007. Four Sineva SLBMs for Tula were produced in 2006, and another 12 are scheduled for production in 2007 – part of the batch of 17 strategic missiles whose acquisition is planned for this year (in addition to five Topol-Ms, as noted above). [25]

Modernization of the Air Leg of the Triad Will Proceed Slowly
At a press conference in January 2007, Commander of the Russian Air Force Army General Vladimir Mikhailov discussed the near-term plans for modernizing the air-based leg of the Russian strategic triad – Tu-95MS and Tu-160 heavy bombers. [26] He said that modernization in coming years will concentrate on installing new electronics, including new weapons control and guidance equipment, as well as equipping heavy bombers with non-nuclear long-range cruise missiles. The new weapons, Mikhailov stated, will allow Russia to use strategic aircraft for missions “outside the nuclear deterrence relationship.” He also disclosed that in the future, the Air Force will purchase two new or modernized heavy bombers every three years and that these new or modernized aircraft will be primarilyTu-160s.

Mikhailov’s statement indicates that the Air Force will experience the same slow-paced rate of modernization as other legs of the Russian strategic triad. In contrast to the SRF, however, which relies first and foremost on deployment of new Topol-M missiles, the Air Force will concentrate on the modernization of existing delivery platforms. This is hardly surprising, because existing heavy bombers (15 Tu-160 and 64 Tu-95MS) can remain in service for another two or three decades. The first modernized Tu-160 equipped for conventional long-range Kh-555 cruise missiles entered service in the summer of 2006 after long delays. [27] Mikhailov’s press conference seems to indicate that in the future the rate of modernization will be somewhat higher. Commenting in early 2006, Igor Khvorov, the commander of the 37th Army of Long-Range Aviation, stated that modernization of the Tu-160 force will take 10-15 years, after which the Air Force intends to begin purchasing a new type of strategic aircraft; he made clear, however, that the new type will be based on the Tu-160. [28]

Nikolai Sokov – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies