China’s January 11, 2007, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test received extensive attention in India. Ironically, the test took place the same day that the Indian space establishment was to receive the first images from the Cartosat-2 satellite, which had been launched on January 10, 2007. The Cartosat-2 can potentially be used for military surveillance purposes, although its stated official purpose is for cartography. [1] The Chinese test indicates that this and any subsequently orbited Indian satellites could be vulnerable to attack in a future confrontation between the two nations – or in one involving India and Pakistan, China’s nuclear-armed regional ally.

An early indication of Indian concerns came on January 25, 2007, during a summit in New Delhi, when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed their strong opposition to the introduction of weapons into the space environment. The two leaders also announced that the foreign ministers of Russia, India, and China would meet in the near future to explore avenues on trilateral cooperation, including cooperation on their future space programs. [2]

Other senior Indian government figures were circumspect in describing the Chinese test. Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee said that countries should reinforce their efforts to bring about a comprehensive international regime that would ensure the peaceful use of space. [3] The point was echoed by the Defense Minister A.K. Antony, who said that India was opposed to the weaponization of outer space and that states should conduct space operations jointly to best exploit the expertise of all participants. [4] The remarks by the two ministers were made at a major conference on aerospace power in New Delhi. The event, held in the first week of February 2007 to commemorate the platinum jubilee of the Indian Air Force (IAF), was attended by air force chiefs from around the world. At the meeting, the Chinese representative, Major General Liu Xinjiang, deputy commander of the Lanzhou Regional Air Force, reiterated that China stood for peaceful uses of space and opposed its weaponization. [5]

While India’s official responses were relatively mild, some observers in the Indian media used the fact of the Chinese test to levy scathing criticism against the Indian government. One influential daily stated in an editorial that the Chinese test exposed India’s “lack of a military space strategy.” [6] It stated that the outdated ideas of the Indian scientific and bureaucratic establishments were hindering India’s space-related military strategy, which, it stated, should be developed in cooperation with the United States. [7]

Indian defense scientists were also vocal in expressing their concerns. One senior scientist, noting that India was already suffering from a “capability gap” with China, stated that the test exacerbated this disparity to the point of causing a “paradigm shift” in the relative military strength of the two states. The change, he said, would dramatically influence the conduct of any future conflict. [8]

One Indian military expert, noting that China’s anti-satellite project is controlled by the Chinese Central Military Commission, pointed to the failure of the Indian military to become engaged in India’s space program. [9] He expressed concern that China’s anti-satellite expertise and its increasing focus on anti-missile defense capabilities could significantly degrade India’s strategic nuclear deterrent. [10] He also highlighted the potential threat posed by China’s growing cooperation with Pakistan in developing multi-mission satellites, which will increase Pakistan’s surveillance capabilities, even as China’s anti-satellite weapon capability makes India’s emerging space-based surveillance system more vulnerable. [11] The analyst also stressed that while China’s military-related space capabilities are being expanded as a response to U.S. dominance in space, Beijing’s growing prowess in this environment could easily be used against India in a future confrontation. [12]

Renewed Debate Over Aerospace Command
The IAF responded to the Chinese test by reviving proposals to reorganize the country’s fledgling military space capabilities. In late January 2007, the head of the Air Force, Air Chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi, stated that India would form an aerospace command in the near future to protect the country’s space-based assets. Discussions of such an organizational change had been in progress for nearly two years, he noted, adding that a “core group” for such a command is already in the training stage. [13] “We will take help from ISRO [the Indian Space Research Organization] for the aerospace command,” he continued, “but it will have distinct features as it is a military command.” Military sources said the IAF would try and replicate the North American Aerospace Defense Command set up by the United States and Canada, which detects and tracks threatening man-made objects in outer space. The origins of the Indian program can be traced as far back as 2003, when Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy, the chief of the Indian Air Force at that time, announced that work had started on an aerospace command to have weapon platforms in space. “Any country on the fringe of space technology like India has to work towards such a command as advanced countries are already moving towards laser weapon platforms in space and killer satellites," he said. [14]

However, progress toward establishing this command has been hampered by the long-standing rivalry among India’s three military services. While the government has reportedly decided to set up the command at Akkulam, in the southern state of Kerala, the Navy and the Army fear that this will lead to domination of aerospace operations by the IAF. [15] This issue was considered by Defense Minister Antony, who stated recently that the government had not yet decided whether the aerospace command would be a tri-service organization or an IAF-controlled operation. [16] It is likely to be six to seven years before an operational space command that includes air and space assets can be in place. [17] But though the aerospace command has not yet been established, the IAF headquarters has created a “Space Sub-branch.” [18]

Apart from the inter-service rivalry, international political considerations also influence decision-making on this issue. According to some sources, India’s civilian leaders are uneasy about creating a full-fledged aerospace command because it might imply that India had opted for weaponization of its space assets. [19] At a time when New Delhi plans to enhance its civilian space program through cooperation with the United States, overt steps toward weaponization of India’s space capabilities could lead to restrictions on U.S. technology sharing. India’s commercial satellite-launch services business, which has a growing international clientele, might also be adversely affected, if its space program were perceived as increasingly militarized. [20]

Regardless of domestic and external pressures against a formal aerospace command, China’s test has galvanized the debate on the military potential of India’s space capabilities and intentions. Defense Ministry proposals on enhancing India’s space-based systems now receiving attention include integrating three Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) planes (to be purchased from Israel and deployed by 2009) with satellite communications, as part of an indigenously developed Air Command and Control System (ACCS). [21]

Recent Indian Space and Missile Program Developments
The Chinese anti-satellite test came in the midst of several significant developments in the Indian space and missile programs. In January 2007, for example, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) was able to successfully recover a space capsule that had been launched from a Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). [22] This test was seen as an example of India’s advancing space program, which now includes a proposed manned moon mission. It was also a welcome development for ISRO after the failed launch of the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) in October 2006.

In his response to the Chinese test, ISRO chairman G. Madhavan Nair labeled the interception “unethical” because it created debris that could damage other satellites. [23] He stated that India had also developed the capability to destroy satellites, but had refrained from demonstrating it, because the country adhered to international norms on the peaceful use of space. [24] Other sources, at the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), responsible for India’s missile programs, stated that at present India did not intend to develop anti-satellite technology and was concentrating on developing long-range cruise missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. [25]

In December 2006, the Indian defense establishment conducted the first test of its missile defense capabilities, in which an interceptor (codenamed PAD) destroyed a Prithvi short-range ballistic missile at a height of roughly 50 kilometers (km). (In contrast, the satellite destroyed in the Chinese test was orbiting at a distance of 865 km above the Earth.) Following the Chinese test, DRDO chief M. Natarajan stated that the Indian anti-missile test was a major achievement, although he acknowledged it would be some time before India might possess an anti-satellite capability. [26] In June 2007, the DRDO plans to test a second anti-ballistic missile (codenamed AAD); it will be comparable to the U.S. Patriot system, designed to intercept short- and medium-range missiles. [27] Following the PAD anti-missile test, India conducted the thirteenth test of the BrahMos cruise missile in early February, during which the missile, flying at nearly three times the speed of sound, for the first time followed a maneuverable “S” curve trajectory. [28]

While the DRDO has made some recent progress in missile development, especially in cruise missiles (and now with anti-missile technology), it has not been able to develop a military satellite for the armed forces, a long-standing demand of the latter. The military satellite project is being developed in cooperation with ISRO. [29] Reports in 2006 stated that this surveillance and reconnaissance satellite would be completed in 2007. [30] Indian military experts have bemoaned the fact that China has some nine satellites for exclusive use by its armed forces, while India has only a single experimental satellite, which has limited military use. This unit is now potentially vulnerable to Chinese ASAT capabilities. [31]

India will take a major step in the realm of space-based communications through its impending participation in the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), under an agreement that was concluded during the January 2007 visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to India. [32] GLONASS, which has both civilian and military uses, is akin to the U.S. Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) System. Moscow and New Delhi have agreed that two current-generation GLONASS-M satellites will be launched aboard India’s GSLV launch vehicle and that India will assist in the development of additional satellites for this project. [33] New Delhi had also held discussions on participating in the parallel European system, Galileo, but India lost interest in this possibility once it determined that the system did not have satisfactory firewalls against potential intrusion by military adversaries. [34] It should be noted that China is a part of the Galileo network.

Conclusion
Although India has never sought strategic parity with China, the Chinese ASAT test has highlighted a new Indian vulnerability, as the country moves in coming years to develop modern military observation and communication satellites. Today, a clash between India and China appears very unlikely, but a confrontation between India and Pakistan, with the potential for the exchange of nuclear-armed missiles, remains a source of international concern. In such a regional conflict, satellite observation of troop movements and mobile-missile deployments could be crucial to the readiness of Indian ground forces and anti-missile systems – and to efforts to de-escalate such a crisis. China’s ability to provide such reconnaissance to Pakistan, while using its ASAT capabilities on behalf of its ally to blind India, could well become a focus of concern in New Delhi. Despite India’s rhetorical support for a comprehensive regime to prevent the introduction of weapons into outer space, it remains uncertain whether India would support an international ban on ASAT systems before it has a proven ASAT capability of its own. In the meantime, New Delhi may quietly seek to reinforce intelligence ties to the United States and/or Russia to ensure access to satellite observation capabilities that China might be reluctant to target and that, if attacked, would be more likely to withstand Chinese interference than India’s nascent system.

Go to: Part II - Russia Walks a Fine Line in Assessing Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapon Test