On April 25, 2007, North Korea held a large military parade in Pyongyang’s Kim Il Sung Square to honor the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army (KPA). [1] For the first time in 15 years, North Korea displayed ballistic missiles, including Scud (Hwasŏng) variants, a new short-range KN-02, and the intermediate-range Musudan. The KN-02, which was flight-tested in April and May 2005, is a North Korean version of the Soviet SS-21. [2] The solid-fuel, mobile KN-02 has a range of about 120 kilometers (km), giving North Korea the capability to strike U.S. military bases in Osan, and P’ŏngt’aek, South Korea.

There were numerous press reports that North Korea displayed “48 missiles of four different types,” but a review of television coverage indicates that North Korea only broadcast images of the KN-02 and Scud (Hwasŏng) variants. [3] The television broadcast had been edited to preclude a clear or extended view of the missiles. Although it was not possible to tell the total number of missiles displayed by viewing the North Korean television coverage, subsequent press reports claim that U.S. satellite imagery detected the presence of a new mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) based on the Soviet submarine-launched R-27 (or SS-N-6 in the NATO classification system). [4] The new intermediate-range missile has been named Musudan, although it has also been called the BM-25, the Mirim, and the Nodong-B. Media reports speculate that the missile’s range is between 2,500 and 5,000 km, but 5,000 km is probably beyond the missile’s capability. Iran reportedly signed a deal with North Korea to purchase 18 of the Musudan (BM-25) missiles in 2006, and flight-tested one to a range of over 3,000 km in January of that year. [5] Media reports claim that U.S. and South Korean intelligence officials are trying to confirm reports that Iran conducted the January 2006 Musudan flight-test for North Korea. [6]

On July 4, 2006, North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, including the Paektusan-2 [Taepodong-2], from Musudan-ri, North Hamgyŏng Province, and Kittaeryŏng, Anbyŏng-kun, Kangwŏn Province. Iranian officials were reportedly present at Musudan-ri to observe the Paektusan-2 launch, and some press reports speculated that North Korea flight-tested a new intermediate-range missile (the Musudan) with a range of 4,000 km based on the Soviet R-27 (or SS-N-6). [7] However, on May 16, 2007, South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency quoted one U.S. intelligence official as having said he or she knows that the new IRBM does not resemble the seven missiles launched in July 2006. [8] Most reports about the July 2006 test assert that North Korea flight-tested a Scud-ER (extended range) during that exercise. [9]

History of the Musudan Program
While the April KPA parade was most likely the first public display of the current version of
the Musudan IRBM, the Musudan development program began approximately 15 years ago, apparently in May 1992. At that time, Igor Velichko, general designer of the Russian V.P. Makeyev Engineering Design Office, visited Pyongyang to sign a $3 million contract with the Korea Yŏn’gwang Trading Company to “send Russian professors to teach in North Korea.” [10] The agreement included a provision to send Russian engineers to North Korea to assist in the development of a space launch vehicle called “Zyb,” which is a term Makeyev uses for the R-27 (SS-N-6). [11] The contract was reportedly approved by Russia’s Ministry of General Machine Building and the Russian Security Ministry, but between October and December 1992, dozens of Russian engineers, including ballistic missile specialists from the V.P. Makeyev Engineering Design Office, were arrested by Russian authorities as they attempted to travel to Pyongyang. [12] However, press reports indicate that many Russian rocket specialists had already been working secretly in North Korea and that many of the scientists who had been intercepted in late 1992 were planning to travel to North Korea through Europe at a later date. [13]

In September 2003, 10 Musudan missiles and five mobile launchers were reportedly spotted at Mirim Airfield near Pyongyang in preparation for display during the September 9th parade in commemoration of the 55th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK; however, the missiles were not exhibited at the parade, apparently for political considerations. [14] In 2003 and early 2004, U.S. satellite imagery detected about 10 Musudan missiles and launchers at two underground missile bases under construction at Yangdŏk-kun, South P’yŏng’an Province, and Sangnam-ri, Hŏch’ŏn-kun, South Hamgyŏng Province. The construction of the bases was reportedly about 70-80 percent complete at that time. [15] These reports were confirmed on July 7, 2004, when South Korean Defense Minister Cho Yŏng-gil testified before the National Assembly that North Korea was in the process of producing and deploying a new IRBM. [16] A November 2006 report in Jane’s Intelligence Review asserted that North Korea had deployed about 15-20 Musudan (BM-25) missiles. [17]

On May 17, 2007, Patricia Sanders, executive director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, told an audience at the National Defense University that since the early 2000s, North Korea has been developing a new IRBM with a range of at least 3,200 km. Sanders reportedly told the Yonhap News Agency that there has been considerable speculation about surrogate countries flight-testing missiles for North Korea, but that she had no specific information about the Musudan. [18] Sanders also reportedly said North Korea has recently acquired a solid fuel capability for its ballistic missiles. [19]

Notably, North Korea agreed to implement a ballistic missile flight-test moratorium in September 1999 “for as long as the United States and the DPRK are engaged in talks to improve bilateral relations.” [20] The Bush Administration declined to continue the Clinton Administration’s bilateral missile talks with Pyongyang, but in May 2001, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il told a visiting European delegation that North Korea would continue the moratorium until at least 2003. [21] The moratorium continued until July 5, 2006, a seven-year period that overlapped with the later stages of the Musudan’s development; no tests of the system are known to have taken place in North Korea since July 5, 2006. Russian scientists, if they were involved in the project as reports suggest, would have had to modify the R-27 (SS-N-6) substantially to make it usable as a road mobile missile. They could not have simply replicated the system from any existing Soviet/Russian blueprints they might have possessed for the R-27. These factors provide strong circumstantial evidence that the missile could have been flight-tested outside North Korea. Given the close links between Iran’s missile program and that of North Korea, Iran appears to be the state most likely to have conducted surrogate tests of the system for Pyongyang. (Pakistan, another possible candidate, is not known to have tested missiles with ranges greater than 2,000 km, and the first test of this system took place in April 2006.)

North Korea and Iran Strengthen Ties
The news of North Korea’s new missile development and Iran’s possible assistance in its testing comes at a time when North Korea and Iran are taking steps to strengthen their bilateral ties. On May 10, 2007, Iranian Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yŏng-il signed a bilateral cooperation agreement in Tehran. [22] According to the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), Tehran is seeking better ties with Pyongyang in the realm of politics, economics, and culture. [23] Foreign Minister Mottaki reportedly said that North Korean debt to Iran is an obstacle to cooperation, but added that the “two countries can find a way to remove this obstacle.” The amount and origins of the debt are unknown. [24]

Given North Korea’s chronic balance of payments deficits and shortage of foreign exchange, Pyongyang’s ability to repay this debt is likely very limited. Providing missiles, missile components and/or technology is one possibility for addressing this problem, but this would violate UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which was passed in response to Pyongyang’s July 2006 missile exercise and prohibits UN member states from acquiring North Korean missiles and missile-related components and technologies. [25] North Korean missile sales to Iran would also violate UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747, which prohibit UN member states from making such sales to Tehran. [26] Nevertheless, the possibility of missile trade between the two countries cannot be ruled out, considering the fact that their bilateral missile cooperation dates back to the 1980s, and that Iranian Vice President Parviz Davoodi reportedly told Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yŏng-il during his recent visit to Tehran that cooperation between the two countries would now “expand without limits.” [27]


Daniel A. Pinkston – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies