The election of Barack Obama – who has long expressed strong support for ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) – has increased global expectations that the United States will ratify the CTBT and thereby impart new momentum to the decades-long campaign to ban all nuclear weapons testing. Treaty supporters have cited many potential advantages to be gained from its entry into force, including strengthening of the global nonproliferation regime and contributing to the realization of the ultimate goal of universal nuclear disarmament. Yet, supporters may overestimate the Obama administration’s ability both to secure the CTBT’s ratification by the U.S. Senate and to foster the willingness of other CTBT holdouts to reverse their positions regarding the accord.

Background
The CTBT prohibits all nuclear explosions, whether for military or other purposes, in any environment. Its practical effect would be to extend the testing prohibitions contained in current treaties and agreements to encompass the testing of nuclear devices underground, the last medium not formally prohibited by existing bans. When the CTBT opened for signature on September 24, 1996, 71 national governments immediately signed it, including all five NPT-recognized nuclear weapons states. As of early December 2008, 180 national governments (out of 195 possible signatories) have signed the treaty, and 148 countries have deposited their instruments of ratification with the UN Secretary General. [1] Still, the CTBT has not yet entered into force. The treaty specifies that it will do so only after all 44 “nuclear-capable states” (those countries that possessed nuclear research or power reactors at the time the CTBT opened for signature) have ratified the treaty. [2] Three such states have not signed the CTBT: India, North Korea, and Pakistan. Six others have signed but not ratified the treaty: the People’s Republic of China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and the United States. Five of these so-called “hold-out” states conducted nuclear explosions before the CTBT opened for signature. Despite their status, most of these governments have adopted a formal or de facto moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.

The United States
Most of the international attention on bringing the CTBT into force focuses on how to secure U.S. ratification of the treaty. For example, the June 2006 report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission chaired by Hans Blix relates that, “The Commission believes that a U.S. decision to ratify the CTBT would strongly influence other countries to follow suit. It would decisively improve the chances for entry into force of the treaty and would have more positive ramifications for arms control and disarmament than any other single measure.” [3] Participants in the September 2007 Entry-in-Force (EIF) Conference expressed the same sentiments. [4] Supporters hope that U.S. entry would trigger a cascade of ratifications, with Beijing following Washington, India following China, Islamabad following New Delhi, and Iran, North Korea, and Indonesia joining the bandwagon so as not to appear the sole hold-out states.

The Clinton administration played an active role in drafting the CTBT, and it signed the treaty on September 24, 1996, the first day the accord was available for signature. Although the administration had hoped to use the momentum generated by the April 1998 British and French ratifications to secure Senate approval, various procedural, partisan, ideological, and substantive considerations made this impossible. [5] After the Senate refused to provide its advice and consent on October 13, 1999, the Clinton administration nevertheless informed other governments that Washington would continue to abide by the CTBT.

The George W. Bush administration, while continuing to abide by the CTBT’s terms, has not sought the treaty’s Senate ratification. Administration representatives have deemed the accord unverifiable and ineffective at curbing nuclear proliferation or nuclear terrorism, and U.S. government officials have stopped attending the biennial EIF conferences. The Bush administration has nonetheless urged countries to refrain from testing nuclear weapons.

The Bush administration does view the monitoring network established under the auspices of the organization created by the treaty (the so-called CTBTO) as useful in supplementing the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS) for detecting and assessing possible nuclear explosions. This International Monitoring System (IMS) – which has already required an investment of over $1 billion to construct, maintain, and modernize – has monitoring stations in or near China, Russia, and other geographic regions where USAEDS coverage is weak. [6] The United States, like other governments that have signed the CTBT, can receive any data generated by the IMS even without the CTBT’s entry into force.

Although the Bush administration has not resumed nuclear weapons testing, it has sought to avoid foreclosing that option through CTBT ratification. The White House told the Congress in 2007, for example, that, “While supporting the continued voluntary moratorium on testing, the Administration strongly opposes… calls for the ratification of the CTBT. It would be imprudent to tie the hands of a future administration that may have to conduct a test of an element of an aging, unmodernized stockpile in order to assure the reliability of the nuclear deterrent force.” [7] The Bush administration has also tried to reduce the preparation time needed to conduct another nuclear test should the United States decide to do so.

The Obama Agenda
President-elect Barack Obama and his national security advisors have expressed strong support for the CTBT. In the language of the presidential candidate’s website: “Barack Obama will work with the Senate to secure the ratification of the CTBT at the earliest practical date and will then launch a diplomatic effort to bring on board other states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force,” [8] a position candidate Obama reaffirmed in answers to questions submitted to the candidates by the Arms Control Association. [9] Before the campaign began in earnest, Senator Obama cited in a Foreign Affairs article “recent technological advances” as enhancing the prospects for U.S. ratification. [10]

On October 28, 2008, Robert Gates, who has agreed to stay on as Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration, told an audience at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that the United States “probably should” ratify the CTBT, provided it included adequate verification measures and the U.S. government pursued a major nuclear modernization program. [11]

Mr. Obama’s election has heightened expectations among the treaty’s supporters that the United States will soon secure both the two-thirds vote of the Senate needed for ratification and a positive response from the other holdout countries. Two weeks after the elections, for example, CTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Toth told a meeting of the organization’s 180 member states that Obama’s victory meant “we are turning the corner in a wider political sense ... and the nine remaining dominoes should fall.” [12] The chairman of the CTBTO meeting, Hans Lundborg, estimated that universal ratification could occur within as little as two years if the hoped-for ratification cascade occurred:“We have political momentum after the U.S. election ... and Obama’s message is extremely crucial to us, and for other countries to pick up that
message.” [13]

Will these expectations be met?

The Major Hold-Outs
The United States remains the most prominent country that has not ratified the CTBT, but other states have resisted signing or ratifying the CTBT for a diverse range of specific concerns.

China
Since signing the treaty on September 24, 1996, the Chinese government has formally submitted the CTBT to the National People’s Congress for ratification. Chinese officials have also repeatedly affirmed their support for the accord and for the principle of ending all nuclear weapons testing. [14] In addition, they have frequently pledged not to resume nuclear testing. The Chinese government has created an agency to oversee the country’s preparations for the CTBT’s entry into force and is helping construct and modernize 11 IMS detection stations and a supporting radionuclide laboratory on its territory. [15] The Chinese delegate to the last two EIF Conferences affirmed that “all necessary work is underway in a serious and orderly fashion” toward ratification. [16]

When the U.S. Senate rejected CTBT ratification, Sha Zukang, then head of the arms control department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said Beijing was gravely disappointed. [17] More recently, Shen Dingli, Director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, wrote that, as President, Mr. Obama would likely seek to cooperate with China against WMD proliferation by promoting CTBT ratification and universal nuclear disarmament. [18]

For unstated reasons, however, the People’s Congress, which normally rubber stamps whatever national security legislation is placed before it, has yet to ratify the treaty. The Chinese government may be awaiting U.S. ratification before formally joining the CTBT. Gareth Evans, Co-Chair of the International Commission for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and a former Australian foreign minister, argued that after Mr. Obama’s election, if the new U.S. administration secured Senate approval of the treaty, “China would find itself under irresistible pressure to itself…ratify the CTBT... And that in turn would I think have ripple effects right throughout the international community.” [19]

Yet, Chinese officials might also be seeking to keep open the option of further nuclear testing, which would help China develop its next generation of nuclear weapons (e.g., missiles armed with lighter, multiple independently targeted warheads). China is the only member of the P-5 that continues to increase its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile arsenals. [20]

Pakistan and India
Following their parallel nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, both India and Pakistan have refrained from further nuclear testing. In their June 2004 joint statement, moreover, both sides pledged to adhere to a moratorium on further nuclear tests as well as to pursue other confidence-building measures. The delegate from Pakistan spoke at the 2007 EIF Conference for the first time since 1999. [21] “Despite being a non–signatory State, we are not opposed to the objectives and purposes of the Treaty,” he observed. “We were not the first to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia and our nuclear tests in 1998 were meant to restore the strategic balance in the region.” [22] Nonetheless, Pakistani leaders have indicated they would only join the CTBT if India does so. [23]

India’s status as a “nuclear capable” country requires that New Delhi ratify the treaty for it to come into force. Indian officials have long refused to sign the current CTBT, although they have renounced any attempt to block it. During the 1994-96 negotiations of the CTBT, Indian representatives objected that the draft treaty language failed to mandate an end to all nuclear weapons development activities, including those not involving nuclear detonations. They also observed that the formula adopted for requiring the CTBT’s entry into force appeared designed to coerce India’s consent in violation of customary international law. These complained further that the proposed treaty did not require the existing nuclear powers to commit to a timetable for eliminating their nuclear arsenals. [24] India has not sent a delegate to the EIF conferences for several years. Most recently, the Indian government proved unwilling to sign the CTBT even as a means to increase U.S. and other international support for the U.S.-Indian civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement. [25] [For more on the agreement and Indian views, see “The US-Indian 123 Agreement: Indian Perspectives on the NSG Approval and the Significance of the Deal” elsewhere in this issue.]

India might be the “hold-out” state most affected by the outcome of the U.S. election. President Bush has been unwilling to pressure India to sign the CTBT in return for increased civil nuclear cooperation. In contrast, Mr. Obama singled out Pakistan and India during the presidential campaign as two countries he would like to see join the CTBT as part of his regional peace and global disarmament programs. [26]

President-elect Obama’s advisors have indicated that the new President will continue to support the U.S.-Indian civil nuclear energy agreement. [27] Yet, the Indian press claims that Obama “is going to put the same pressure on India to sign the CTBT that the Bush administration applied on member states of the NSG to let them sell nuclear equipment and technology to India.” [28] Mr. Obama’s statements and the strong support for the treaty shown by many of his senior national security advisors have led some Indian commentators to urge a reconsideration of India’s approach toward the CTBT. Others continue to oppose the treaty on various grounds. One Indian commentator, Siddharth Varadarajan, observed that “the Democratic re-conquest of the White House has filled the strategic establishment with a certain sense of foreboding and dread.” He noted in particular that a “[s]et of concerns revolves around arms control issues. With Barack Obama reiterating his commitment to the early U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the early conclusion of a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), there is a feeling that India will soon find itself under pressure to forswear nuclear testing and the production of weapons-grade nuclear material forever.” [29]

Varadarajan nevertheless maintains that “India has no reason to feel perturbed” because “presumably, a thorough internal assessment was made in 1998 when Mr. Vajpayee told the U.N. that India would not stand in the way of the treaty entering into force.” According to Varadarajan, “What that meant, in practical terms, was that if all countries whose ratification was needed for the CTBT to enter force were on board barring India, New Delhi would then be willing to convert its de facto test moratorium into a de jure commitment.” Varadarajan asserts that this position, which no Indian party contested at the time, “could form the basis for a national consensus on the subject even today.” [30]

Uday Bhaskar likewise argues that, since the Indian government pledged to adhere to a voluntary testing moratorium following its May 1998 nuclear detonations, and because successive governments have adhered to that position, it would cost little for India to convert the unilateral declaration into a legally binding international treaty. [31]

Both India’s geopolitical strategists and its most enthusiastic nuclear disarmers fault the treaty, though for different reasons. Indian opponents of the CTBT cite China’s continued non-ratification of the treaty as a reason for New Delhi, Beijing’s sometimes rival, to avoid formal adherence to the text. [32] They also worry that, unlike the reliably pro-Indian administration of George W. Bush, his successor might be more interested in improving relations with China: “The Bush administration promoted India with zeal to position this country as a force which could counter China in Asia. The dynamics of the U.S. relationship vis-a-vis India and China might also see transformation.” [33] Conversely, many Indians continue to depict the CTBT as a distraction from the imperative of achieving universal nuclear disarmament. [34] The Indian government has complained that, as adopted, the CTBT “is not a comprehensive ban but merely a ban on nuclear explosive testing. It also lacks a definitive commitment to nuclear disarmament.” [35]

Indian opponents of the treaty argue that they can successfully resist any campaign by the Obama White House to compel India’s adherence. They argue that the signing and Senate endorsement of the U.S.-Indian Civil Nuclear Agreement has reduced the incoming U.S. administration’s leverage in pressing India to join the CTBT. [36] In contrast, Karl Inderfurth, a key Obama advisor on South Asia, argues that the civil nuclear energy agreement would facilitate U.S. and Indian cooperation on the CTBT and other arms control questions: “we have now recognized that we are tied together on these kinds of issues and have now surmounted a major obstacle that existed for over a quarter of a century-and that was being on opposite sides of the nuclear cooperation issue.” [37]

The Middle East
The government of Iran has signed the CTBT but has declined to ratify it. Iranian officials have complained that, by banning only nuclear explosions, the treaty fails to achieve comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Tehran has also criticized the United States for failing to ratify the CTBT. [38] Citing a constitutional prohibition that disallows implementation of provisions of treaties the parliament has not ratified, in January 2007 the Iranian government suspended data transmissions to the IDC from the five IMS monitoring stations on its territory. [39] Over the long run, the decision of the Iraqi government to sign the CTBT on August 19, 2008 might make Iran more comfortable ratifying and adhering to the treaty. Iraqi forces employed chemical weapons against Iranians during their 1980-88 War, and the two states might naturally seek to balance one another’s unconventional warfare capabilities. (The government of another Arab country, Lebanon, ratified the CTBT in late November 2008.) [40]

Egyptian officials, while expressing support for the principles underpinning the CTBT, have indicated they will not ratify the accord until Israel joins the NPT. [41] At the September 2005 EIF Conference in New York, the Egyptian delegate, Amr Aboul Atta, reaffirmed his government’s support for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East and other arms control measures. But, he added, “we cannot regard the treaty as a secluded legal instrument apart from our common objectives to achieve nuclear disarmament and the universality of nonproliferation. Hence Egypt calls for the achievement of the universality of both the NPT and the CTBT together.” He specifically referred to “the importance of Israel’s accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.” [42]

The Israeli government signed the CTBT on September 25, 1996. Two auxiliary IMS seismic stations and a radionuclide laboratory are being established on its territory. In addition, Israeli representatives have helped develop the CTBTO’s on-site inspection mechanisms and other procedures. [43] At more than one EIF Conference, Israel’s head delegates have expressed strong support for the treaty. But they have also raised concerns about misuse of the verification regime to collect sensitive information concerning Israel’s security, efforts by the other treaty members to exclude Israel from CTBTO organs, such as its Middle East and South Asia (MESA) regional grouping or its Executive Council, and the non-membership of other Middle Eastern states such as Iran and Egypt. [44] Even so, observers note that Israel’s own ratification of the treaty would not present any major security difficulties since Israel is widely considered to have developed an effective nuclear arsenal even in the absence of nuclear testing. [45]

The lack of pressure from the Bush administration to ratify the CTBT may have also affected Israeli decision-making. [46] This could change in the Obama administration. Some nuclear industry experts anticipate that if the United States ratifies the CTBT, the Israeli government will do likewise in the hopes of lifting the trade embargo the NSG has imposed on Israel. Israeli policy-makers recognize, however, that Israel, unlike India, will likely need to ratify the CTBT to receive treatment similar to that New Delhi recently enjoyed. [47]

North Korea
The Bush administration has also declined to pressure North Korea to sign the CTBT as part of the Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, focusing instead on eliminating the country’s nuclear weapons capacity more directly by constraining its nuclear research and development programs. The fact that Pyongyang’s main foreign ally, China, has yet to ratify the CTBT may also have decreased pressure on the North Korean leadership to sign and ratify the CTBT. The governments of South Korea and Japan have urged Pyongyang more explicitly to sign and ratify the treaty, but they appear to exert less influence on the country than Washington or Beijing. (The South Korean government has been a strong supporter of the CTBT, having signed and ratified the treaty at an early opportunity. [48]) North Korea has never sent an official to the biannual EIF conferences or displayed any other intent to join the CTBT.

Proponents of the CTBT cited the success of the IMS in detecting the nature and magnitude of the DPRK’s nuclear test as demonstrating its effectiveness. In October 2006, the IMS easily detected North Korea’s detonation, which fell below the 1-kiloton threshold, sometimes erroneously described as the lowest assured verification level offered by the CTBT regime. [49] They warned, however, that the North Korean action, which violated a de facto moratorium against nuclear testing, underscored the need to secure universal CTBT ratification. [50] Treaty opponents observed that the North Korean test, as well as Pyongyang’s earlier withdrawal from the NPT, showed the limited utility of nuclear arms control measures in the face of rogue regimes. Even so, a North Korean government that genuinely sought nuclear rehabilitation and reintegration into the international community might ratify – and even comply with – the treaty.

Prospects
U.S. supporters of the CTBT express optimism about the treaty’s eventual ratification. For example, Joseph Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshares Fund, believes that the political environment is fundamentally different than in 1998: “Clinton was always playing defense on arms control in order to protect his domestic agenda from the right wing of the Republican Party. I believe a President Obama will be just as interested on international issues as domestic, and he will not be looking for tactical positioning. I think transformation is part of his world view.” [51]

Notwithstanding President-elect Obama’s strong public support for the treaty and the optimism of his advisors, it remains unclear whether sufficient turnover has occurred in the U.S. Senate during the past decade to ensure the CTBT’s ratification. Treaty proponents estimate that at least 60 Senators support ratification in principle, but securing the required 67 affirmative vote will prove difficult. [52]

Although John McCain and other Senators who voted against U.S. ratification in 1998 have expressed a willingness to approach the CTBT with an open mind, they might link their support to certain conditions. In 2001, for instance, General John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed that the United States ratify the CTBT with the stipulation that every ten years it would reassess if the treaty still contributed a net benefit to U.S. security, allowing for possible withdrawal if the assessment yielded a negative conclusion. [53] In November 2007, Harold Brown and John Deutsch, who both held senior U.S. national security positions in previous administrations, proposed that the United States support a CTBT that would renew every five years rather than every ten years as the treaty’s text provides. [54]

Yet, the adoption of conditions could reduce support for the treaty among current supporters. Many arms controllers, for example, would probably object to making an administration commitment to proposing new U.S. nuclear weapons research and development programs the price that would have to be paid for CTBT ratification, as some analysts suggest it would.

Even in the case of U.S. ratification, the willingness of all the remaining non-member countries to join the CTBT remains questionable. Many of these governments seem less concerned about the status of the treaty within the United States than whether their neighbors will adhere to the accord. Some may even want to keep open the option of testing nuclear weapons. Securing their support could require additional international pressures as well as incentives, but even then success might prove impossible in the case of some holdouts.

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute