The Six-Party Talks aimed at eliminating the North Korean nuclear weapons program have reached an impasse as the parties were unable to conclude an agreement on a verification protocol during talks in Beijing in early December 2008. The stalemate is another in a series of obstacles that have delayed implementation of the September 19, 2005 “Statement of Principles,” which includes a North Korean commitment to abandon its nuclear programs and return to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in exchange for negative security assurances and political and economic incentives. [1] The lack of progress and other factors raise questions as to whether the 2005 agreement will ever be realized.  Most important in that regard are perhaps recent suggestions that North Korea has “weaponized its nuclear deterrent” and has deployed nuclear warheads for its Nodong
missiles, which could strike Japan.

The Six-Party Process
The process of the denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been separated into three stages – shutdown, disablement, and dismantlement. That process, however, must be coordinated with the delivery of energy assistance and other incentives to Pyongyang. [2] The long-delayed disablement stage is nearly complete, but North Korea has been successful in strengthening its bargaining position at the end of this phase, which has coincided with a period of political transition in the United States. According to the terms of an agreement reached on October 3, 2007, the parties committed to a number of actions to complete the disablement phase by December 31, 2007.  However, the deadline was unrealistic given the complexity and difficulty of the objectives. [3]

The October 3, 2007 agreement on “second phase actions” required North Korea to submit “a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs.” In return, the United States promised to remove the DPRK from the Department of State’s  (DOS) list of state sponsors of terrorism, and to remove sanctions against Pyongyang under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). [4] As the deadline approached in December 2007, however, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan showed U.S. officials only “reference materials,” and Pyongyang appeared to be far from submitting a “complete and correct declaration.” [5] The process was delayed as Washington urged Pyongyang to ensure the accuracy and completeness of its declaration, which North Korea finally submitted on June 26, 2008. Although the declaration has not been released to the public, press reports assert that it does not include the number of nuclear weapons, sites related to weaponization, information related to the uranium enrichment program, or information related to proliferation, to include accusations surrounding alleged North Korean assistance in the construction of a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor that was destroyed by the Israeli air force in September 2007. [6]

Verification Emerges as the Pivot Point
After the DPRK submitted its nuclear declaration to the Chinese chair of the Six-Party Talks, Washington insisted that a verification protocol would be necessary before North Korea could be removed from the DOS terrorism list. As a consequence, verification has emerged as one of the major issues in the talks and could take considerable time to resolve. In late 2003, the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Verification and Compliance began working on a proposed verification plan that reportedly gave the United States extraordinary authority to conduct inspections “anywhere, anytime, and with no notice.” [7]

 Pyongyang has demanded a less intrusive verification regime that would be phased in during the dismantlement phase. In July 2004, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman said that verification and inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities could only be discussed during this final stage. [8] On several occasions, North Korean media and officials have contended that verification must apply to the whole Korean peninsula, and that the non-nuclear status of the Republic of Korea (ROK), including U.S. military bases, must also be verified. [9] While North Korea has a legitimate national interest in a non-nuclear South Korea, which is almost certainly a necessary (although arguably not sufficient) condition for the DPRK to abandon its nuclear ambitions, some officials and analysts believe this is nothing but a negotiation tactic to delay and demand more concessions. [10]

The United States first deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea in 1958 but withdrew them in 1991. [11] While South Korea had an active nuclear weapons program in the 1970s and retains an extensive nuclear power industry, Seoul has signed an Additional Protocol agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Agency has verified that South Korea is in full compliance with its safeguards commitments. [12] If Pyongyang is worried about Seoul’s nuclear activities and how they might be an obstacle to the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, it could raise the issue with the IAEA. Furthermore, the September 2005 Statement of Principles declares that “the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.” The Joint Declaration obliges both Koreas not to possess nuclear weapons, not to enrich uranium, and not to reprocess plutonium. The declaration also provided for the establishment of a joint nuclear control commission and a bilateral nuclear inspection regime, but after several rounds of talks in the early 1990s, the two sides failed to implement the agreement. [13] Verification of South Korea’s non-nuclear status could be reaffirmed by the dormant inter-Korean joint nuclear control commission so that the DPRK can achieve its declared denuclearization objective.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill traveled to Pyongyang in early October 2008 in an effort to forge an agreement on verification with North Korea. The two sides, however, were only able to reach a non-binding, ambiguous understanding that was subject to interpretation.  It also needed to be approved by the other Six-Party delegations. Ambassador Kim Sook, head of the South Korean delegation, believes a “serious misunderstanding” arose between U.S. and North Korean negotiators over their agreement to follow “scientific procedures.” [14] The U.S. view is broad and comprehensive while North Korean officials assert inspections will only include methods on which the parties agree in advance.

The North Korean delegation was described as being very uncooperative on the verification issue during the December 2008 Six-Party Talks. The delegations did not discuss the specific role of the IAEA in the verification process, although a strong consensus appears to exist – except with North Korea – that the IAEA should play a prominent role. During the talks, the Russian delegation was adamant about the IAEA being intimately involved throughout the process, despite North Korea’s supposed bitter experience with the Agency. [15] North Korea’s resistance to an IAEA role could simply be a bargaining tactic in an effort to shift responsibility for verification to the United States, which conceivably could give Pyongyang a greater opportunity to interact with Washington on a bilateral basis – a long-standing DPRK foreign policy goal. Other than the IAEA, only the United States has the expertise and resources to verify North Korea’s declaration and denuclearization, so it certainly is in the interests of Moscow and Beijing for the IAEA to serve this role rather than the United States. For Washington, it is more than just a matter of transparency and political legitimacy; verification is costly, and it could be difficult to obtain U.S. Congressional funding for a process that could entail expenditures of over $100 million. [16]

The major stumbling blocks in negotiating a verification protocol are environmental sampling, determining which sites will be subject to inspections, and when access will be granted. The United States insists that inspectors should be allowed to take environmental samples out of the DPRK for analysis, but North Korea claims nothing was said in the October 2008 agreement with Christopher Hill about sampling and that sampling would be an infringement of DPRK sovereignty. [17]

Despite the failure to reach agreement on verification during Christopher Hill’s trip to Pyongyang in early October, the Bush administration removed the DPRK from the Department of State’s terrorism list on October 11, 2008. [18] Washington’s delisting came one day after Tokyo extended sanctions banning all North Korean imports and DPRK ships from Japanese ports. [19] Moreover, Japan has refused to provide the DPRK with energy assistance in the Six-Party framework due to Tokyo’s dissatisfaction with progress on the abduction issue, a problem that has been covered extensively in the international media. [20] Japan was very displeased with the Bush administration’s decision to remove the DPRK from the terrorism list. [21] Most experts, however, expect the rift between Tokyo and Washington to subside in time.

Intense domestic political pressure is apparent in Japan to deny any economic incentives to Pyongyang until North Korea is more forthcoming on the abduction issue. Privately, one Japanese Foreign Ministry official has said the verification issue is more serious and has the potential to cause greater strains between Tokyo and Washington if the United States compromises and accepts an inadequate verification protocol. [22] Meanwhile, Japan’s refusal to provide any energy assistance pending the resolution of the abduction issue – although understandable – has caused frustration in Seoul. South Korea is the chair of the Six-Party Economic and Energy Cooperation Working Group, and is responsible for finding an alternative supplier to provide Japan’s share of 200,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) that has been promised in return for Pyongyang’s nuclear disablement. [23]

The Republic of Korea and the U.S. have approached a number of friendly countries, but it will take several months to work out any arrangements. Australia and New Zealand, for example, have declined to provide any HFO until the Six Parties make progress on a verification protocol. [24] Seoul also approached a few European countries but was rebuffed because the European Union (EU) has not yet formulated a policy on the issue. One Italian diplomat close to the issue described the approach as awkward in terms of protocol, but ROK Foreign Ministry officials explained that the amount of funding is relatively small, and the decision-making process within the European Commission could take a long time for a relatively minor request. [25] However, the ROK is not opposed to an EU role in North Korea’s denuclearization, and Seoul could approach the EU again in the future. [26] Canada has also been approached. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa is quietly discussing the issue, but it is not an urgent priority for the Canadian government, and it could take several months to reach a decision. [27]

In sum, North Korea is expected to receive 800,000 tons of HFO or equivalent in materials, and the remaining 200,000 tons (“Japan’s share”) will be resolved with the verification issue. [28] The United States completed its HFO deliveries in late 2008, and Russia reportedly delivered its last tranche in late January 2009. China and South Korea are providing both HFO and materials such as steel pipes, cooking coal, and some vehicles; their deliveries are nearly complete. [29]

During the December 2008 Six-Party Talks, Japan, South Korea, and the United States presented a unified position on verification, including the issue of sampling and the need to establish a clear verification protocol during the second phase of nuclear disablement before moving on to the third phase of dismantlement. Their common view has been that verification cannot be partitioned and stretched out over time for further negotiation, and that it must be settled before moving to the third phase. [30] However, North Korea’s bargaining position has been strengthened by several factors: 1) Pyongyang has received almost all of its phase-two benefits, including most of the energy assistance and removal from the Department of State’s terrorism list; 2) the present declaration will almost certainly be rejected as “incomplete,” which could lead to the collapse of the talks, and alternatives to the Six-Party Talks at this stage are very unattractive; [31] and 3) increasing evidence suggests that North Korea has weaponized its nuclear devices as ballistic missile warheads.

On January 17, 2009, North Korean officials from the Foreign Ministry and the Korean People’s Army (KPA) told Selig Harrison, a visiting American journalist and scholar, that the DPRK had “weaponized its nuclear deterrent” and that Pyongyang was not in a position to say when it could relinquish its nuclear weapons. DPRK officials also told Harrison they had weaponized 30.8 kg of plutonium. [38] External recognition of “weaponization” would serve two main purposes from Pyongyang’s perspective. First, the DPRK hopes this will elevate North Korea’s status and confer the national prestige necessary to be treated as an equal by the great powers, especially the United States. Second, a major component of nuclear deterrence is psychological; your adversary must believe you have credible and reliable means to deliver unacceptable punishment (nuclear retaliation) for deterrence to be robust. From Pyongyang’s perspective, if North Korea’s adversaries believe it has the capability to deliver nuclear warheads, they almost certainly will be deterred from striking North Korea, even if they have the desire to do so. 

At the same time, a forthcoming International Crisis Group (ICG) report indicates that North Korea has succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear devices as warheads for the Nodong medium-range ballistic missile which is capable of striking most of Japan. The warheads are probably stored in separate underground facilities in the northern part of North Korea near Nodong missile bases. The warheads have not been transferred to the KPA, but Kim Jong-il maintains strict control of the weapons through a special independent organization of the Second Economic Committee, a KWP entity responsible for the munitions industry. The ICG report further indicates that it would take at least one or two days to arm and launch any nuclear missiles, which indicates North Korea does not possess permissive action links (PALs) or environmental sensing devices (ESDs), the sophisticated safety devices needed to prevent an accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation. [39]

While diplomats refuse to recognize North Korea’s nuclear status for political and legal reasons, military planners and policy makers must prepare for contingencies based upon military capabilities. U.S. military planners are increasingly speaking of North Korean “nuclear weapons,” but diplomats and the South Korean government officially use the term “nuclear explosive devices.” Ambassador Kim Sook, head of the ROK delegation to the Six-Party Talks, says the ROK government position regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapon capability is no different from that of the United States, and that Pyongyang has “5 to 8 nuclear explosive devices.” [40] Of course, openly recognizing the existence of North Korean nuclear weapons would have serious implications for the NPT and it could trigger detrimental regional security consequences, including an arms race.

Conclusion
Negotiating a verification protocol is currently the most critical issue in moving the Six-Party process into the third phase of dismantlement. While Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington are united in their effort to conclude a detailed and comprehensive verification agreement before wrapping up the disablement stage, it will be difficult to do so. A phased verification regime is suboptimal from a nonproliferation perspective, but it might be the only realistic option given North Korea’s current bargaining position. Insisting on immediate and comprehensive verification of North Korea’s nuclear declaration will likely lead to a judgment of Pyongyang’s noncompliance or breach of the September 2005 Statement of Principles.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons are vulnerable to a preemptive strike, but North Korea’s conventional forces give Pyongyang the option of massive retaliation against South Korea in the event its nuclear assets are attacked. Paradoxically, North Korea’s conventional deterrent protects its nuclear program from preemption. Unattractive military options mean Washington and its allies have no real choice but to continue diplomatic efforts through the Six-Party process. Pyongyang knows that the collapse of the Six-Party Talks would relegate the issue to the UN Security Council, which has been ineffective in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue.

The only real alternative is to negotiate the best agreement for verifying the second stage of Yongbyon’s disablement, but to require a third stage verification protocol that provides a higher level of confidence and addresses all issues that have been omitted from North Korea’s June 2008 declaration. The third stage requires North Korea’s rejoining the NPT and concluding a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, so Pyongyang cannot avoid verification of its denuclearization unless it reneges on its commitments under the September 2005 Statement of Principles. Although politically unpalatable, this might be the quickest and only way to resolve the impasse over verification.

Daniel A. Pinkston - International Crisis Group